




C E P A L 
Economic Commission for Latin America 
Washington Office 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY* 
^J This draft report, prepared by Robert Devlin of CEPAL's Washington 
Office, is a contribution to the 1980 Economic Survey of Latin America. 
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do 





6 Aprii 1981 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 
Since the mid-1970s the world economy has evidenced a marked slowdown 
from the unprecedented growth and prosperity that was enjoyed in the two 
decades following World War II. While it is uncertain whether the downturn 
is due to cyclical or structural factors, whether it is of a temporary or 
permanent nature, it is nevertheless evident that the slowdown is more 
prolonged and severe than might have been contemplated by many when the 
open manifestations of world-wide economic problems first appeared in 
1/ 
late 1973.— Moreover, as will become clear from the ensuing analysis, 
events in 1979-1980 represent a second major setback for a world economy 
that had been displaying some signs of successful adjustment to the 
well-known economic shocks of 1973-1974. 
\J Some recent work has stressed the structural character of the current 
slowdown in the world economy. See Lester Thurow The Zero Sum Society, 
N.Y., Basic Books, 1980 and Ronald Miiller Revitalizing America, N.Y. 
Simon & Schuster, 1980. The Bank for International Settlements in 
its Forty Eighth Annual Report (Basle, June 1978) also suggests 
structural factors behind current problems and even raises the 
possibility that the world economy is in a Kondratieff type of 
slowdown. W. Arthur Lewis, on the other hand, points out in a recent 
article that many of the indicators of economic malaise such as 
high umemployment, low profits, low investment ratios, etc. are 
merely elements of a cyclical swing and in and of themselves are 
not evidence of a secular decline in growth. While not dismissing 
the possibility that the recent decline in growth rates is of a more 
permanent nature, he points out that the slowdown nevertheless 
displays characteristics similar to 4 other cyclical downturns 
that have occurred since 1873 and which have had a duration of 
roughly 10 years. See W. Arthur Lewis, "The Slowing Down of the 
Engine of Growth" American Economic Review, September 1980, 
pp 555-564. 
I. OUTPUT 
In 1980 the growth of world output slipped to only 2.2%, which 
is considerably below the growth rate of 3.8% achieved in 1979 and 
less than half of the recovery rate of 4.7% recorded in 1976-1978. 
Moreover, the slowdown was all pervasive, as every major country group 
suffered a serious loss of dynamism in economic activity (See table 1). 
The most severe reduction in output growth was in the developed market 
economies, (which basically represent the OECD area), as their joint 
Gross Domestic Product rose by only 1.5%, compared to nearly 4% the year 
before. The centrally planned economies also experienced slippage in 
their growth rates with respect to the modest expansion of 1979. As for 
the developing countries, they suffered a serious setback to their 
growth aspirations, with output expanding by nearly 1% less than the 
already modest rate of 4.8% recorded in 1979; indeed growth was only 
slightly higher than that recorded in the deep recession of 1975. 
The gravity of the world recession in 1980 can perhaps be better 
appreciated by viewing data on world industrial production in table 2. 
Here it is seen that the volume of world industrial output grew by 
only 1.5% in 1980, the second worst performance of the decade. (In 
1975 output underwent an absolute decline.) It also can be seen that 
in this same year the growth of industrial output in the developed 
market economies was virtually nil in 1980, while the expansion in the 
developing countries was a disappointing 1.8%. In 1975, when world industrial 
production plummeted in absolute terms, the centrally planned economies 
managed to insulate themselves from overall trends; this was clearly 
TABLE 1 
WORLD GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(percentage rates of growth 
in real terms) 
Country Groups 1971- 1976- a./ 
1980 1978 1979 1980 
World 4.1 4.7 3.8 2.2 
Centrally Planned —^ 5.5 5.5 3.3 3.1 
c/ 
Developed Market Economies — 3.3 4.3 3.7 1.5 
Developing Countries —^ 5.7 5.2 4.8 3.9 
Source: Cepal on the basis of official data, 
a_/ preliminary 
b/ The data are for Eastern Europe, USSR and China and represent net material product. 
c/ Includes South Africa 
d_/ Includes Israel and Turkey 
TABLE 1 
WORLD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
(growth rates in real terms.) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 - 1 
Average 
1 9 6 8 - 7 8 
WORLD 8 . 9 2 . 4 - 3 . 4 8 . 1 4 . 6 4 . 2 4 . 4 1 . 5 7 . 1 
Centrally Planned h~> 8 . 9 8 . 8 8 . 3 6 . 5 6 . 5 5 . 7 4 . 3 3 . 8 1 1 . 4 
Developed Market 
Economies — 8 . 9 - - 7 . 2 8 . 4 3 . / 4.1 5 . 0 o : 4 5 . 3 
Developing 
countries 1 0 . 8 3 . 3 - 4 . 4 9 . 1 5 . 8 2 . 0 2.4. ; 1 . 8 - 8 . 4 
Source: Calculated from data in United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1981, and estimates of CEPAL. 
a/ Preliminary 
b/ Eastern Europe, USSR, and China, 
c/ Includes Israel and South Africa. 
not the case in 1980howevers as expansion of industrial output was 
considerably less than half of that of 1973-1974. 
Turning to slightly more detailed examination of the economic 
blocs, it is seen that the downturn in the OECD area was generalized, 
but not as severe as that which was experienced in 1974-1975. 
(See table 3). Leading trends were the United States and the 
United Kingdom where output declined in absolute terms. The primary 
factor underlying events was a roughly 140% increase in the average 
price of petroleum^ in 1979-1980 that eroded the area's terms of 
2/ 
trade and reduced incomes by an estimated 2 1/4%. — Slower growth 
of personal incomes adversely affected residential investment, which 
also was severely hurt by tight monetary policies which introduced 
extraordinarily high domestic interest rates in many OECD countries 
(see table 4). Furthermore, fiscal restraint has become a watchword 
in many countries and thus trends in government consumption introduced 
a procyclical contractionary effect. Non-residential investment also sagged 
in this depressed environment, but notably it did not collapse, 
as was the case in 1975, apparently due to the fact that investors 
were somewhat better conditioned to withstand upheavals brought about 
by changing world oil prices. 
Growth of material product in the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries is estimated to have been about 2.9 % in 1980, slightly 
1/ The annual average official 
price of OPEC crude rose from 12.93 dollars 
in 1978 to 30.87 dollars in 1980. The bulk of the price rise took place 
in 19 79, with the price stabilizing at around 32 dollars by mid-1980. 
2/ See OECD, Economic Outlook No. 28, December 1980, p.13 
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TABLE 3 
OECD: GROWTH RATES OF GNP 
(percentage change in real terms) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 - l Average 
1968-78 
OECD 6.3 0.7 -0.5 5.3 3.7 3.9 3.3 1.4 3.8 
United States 5.4 -1.3 -1.0 5.6 5.1 4.4 2.3 -0.2 2.9 
Japan 10.0 -0.3 1.4 6.5 5.4 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.6 
Germany 4.9 0.5 -1.8 5.2 3.0 3.3 4.5 1.8 3.5 
France 5.4 3.2 0.2 5.2 2.8 3.6 3.3 1.6 4.4 
United Kingdom 7.5 -1.2 -0.8 4.2 1.0 3.6 1.5 -3.0 2.3 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
aj preliminary. 
No. 28, December 1980, and CEPAL on the basis of official data. 
TABLE 4 
COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING RATES TO PRIME BORROWERS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(percentage rate at the end of December) 
































Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets, January 1980, p. 20, and February 1981. p. 18. 
higher than the low rate of 2.5% recorded in 1979, but well below the 
average expansion of 6.3% achieved in 1971-1975. The Soviet Union 
—bolstered by a favorable terms of trade, due in part to petroleum 
exports— was actually able to significantly expand real output in 1980. 
This was not the case for the Eastern European countries, however, which 
generally were encountering difficult situations with regard to external 
balances that necessitated a tight rein on economic activity. (In the 
case of Hungary and Poland, output declined in absolute terms.) It 
also should be added that the economic performance in this group of 
countries was handicapped by the second consecutive year of poor 
agriculture output: it is estimated that production declined by 3% 
in 1980, following a 2% drop in 1979. 
In China there was a slowing down of production in industry and 
agriculture from a rate of more than 6% in 1979, to something less than 
5% in 1980. Poor harvests were a major factor behind this performance, 
but there also was a noticeable slackening in the rate of growth of 
heavy industry. 
It is evident that in 1980 the developing countries were unable 
to insulate themselves from the world recession as they did in 1975; 
growth rates were uniformily low in this group of countries. As seen 
in table 5, only South and East Asian countries were able to accelerate 
growth with respect to 1979. 
Countries that are net exporters of petroleum saw their growth 
rates slip from 5.5% in 1979 to 4.0% in 1980. A primary factor behind 
the less dynamic performance was the reduced petroleum production 
that was induced by the recession in the OECD and mild winter weather in the 
North. The Iran-Iraq war was an additional factor. But it also should be mentioned 
that a number of oil producers have been deliberately targeting milder 
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TABLE 5 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(growth rates in real terms) 
1971-1980 1976-1978 1978 1979 1980 
Africa —^ 4.8 6.0 4.8 6.2 5.3 
• 
South & East Asia 5.6 6.8 7.1 2.9 4.7 
c/ Western Asia — 6.4 2.8 1.4 3.7 0.5 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
Memorandum item 
5.8 5.0 4.5 6.2 4.8 
Net energy exporters 5.8 5.0 4.1 5.5 4.0 
Net energy importers 5.6 5.4 5.0 4.3 3.9 
Source: Cepal on the basis of official data. 
_a / Preliminary 
b/ Excludes South Africa 
^c/ Includes Israel and Turkey 
d/ Due to methodological differences, these data are not perfectly compatible with 
* those found in later sections of the Economic Survey. 
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growth rates in order to minimize the social and economic disturbances 
that can be associated with rapid growth; meanwhile some countries 
are focussing their projects on social development which in the near term 
' 'fa 
tends to produce less dramatic rates of economic expansion. 
In 1980 growth sagged further for the net importers of energy 
(see again table 5) on account of an adverse terms of trade and less 
favorable conditions for securing finance to support high growth rates. 
Some large countries such as Brazil and India were able to accelerate 
their growth rates in 1980 on account of recoveries in agricultural 
production. While still other countries also enjoyed better harvests, on 
per capita basis there was no gain in agricultural output for this 
group of countries.—^ On balance it seems fair to say that the 1980 
growth performance represents an unfortunate setback to the non-oil 
exporting developing countries, which have tried so hard to sustain 
high growth rates in the face of the current difficult world economic 
environment. 
c 
1/ See GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981, p.7. 
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II. PRICES 
Serious inflationary pressures continued to plague the world 
¿t 
economy even in the face of^sharp economic slowdown in all geographic 
areas. 
In the OECD area, prices rose, on an annual average basis, 
by 12.5% in 1980, which is a marked increase over the 9.8% rate 
of 1979 and roughly 4 -times the rate of increase in prices that was 
recorded in the decade of the 1960s (see table 6). Among the major 
OECD countries, there was a uniform worsening of the inflationary 
situation: Japan saw its rate of inflation more than double in 
1980, and that of the U.K. increasee by more than a third; meanwhile, 
the U.S., which has traditionally enjoyed one of the most stable 
price structures in the world, had the 11th worst rate of inflation 
in the 24-nation OECD group. Not surprisingly, one of the major 
elements behind the deterioration in price performance was 
adjustment to higher energy costs, but higher food prices also 
contributed to the inflationary spiral. Notably, wages were not a 
major inflationary factor as wage demands have been surprisingly 
restrained since 1978. —^ It is interesting to note that some of the 
worst inflationary performances were in countries with significantly 
appreciating exchange rates (see table 7), which would be consistent 
with the notion that domestic prices tend to be rigid downwards. 
It is notable that for the first time in recent years inflation 
also has become a problem in some centrally planned economies. 
While in most countries official prices moved very little, this 
was accomplished only by official intervention in markets and growing 
fiscal subsidies. In other countries that have tended to rely somewhat 
TABLE 6 
OECD: CONSUMER PRICES 
(percentage average change over previous period) 
A v e 
1961-1970 
r a g e 
1971-1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 - 1 
OECD 8.5 8.9 7.9 9.8 12.5 
United States 2.8 6.6 6.5 7.7 11.3 13.5 
Japan 5.8 11.2 8.1 3.8 3.6 8.0 
Germany 2-7 5.9 3.7 2.7 4.1 5.5 
France 4.0 9.0 9.4 9.1 10.8 13.3 
United Kingdom 4.1 13.6 15.8 8.3 13.4 18.0 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, Deceinber 1980, No. 26, p. 47; IMF International Financial Statistics and Cepal on 
the basis of official data. ' 
a/ Preliminary. 
TABLE 14 
REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES FOR SELECTED 
a / 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES, 1973-1980 -
(1973=100) 
United United 
States a p Kingdom Germany France 
1973 "100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1974 95.1 99.4 100.8 105.3 94.7 
1975 98.6 87.9 104.3 100.4 102.6 
1976 100.1 88.9 96.6 101.2 100.1 
1977 99.9 93.7 101.7 102.7 96.6 
1978 107.5 106.5 103.4 97.3 
1979 95.6 96.2 118.9 104.2 99.2 
1980 97.8 93.9 137.1 101.2 101.0 
Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets (various issues) 
a_/ The index: of the real effective exchange rate is based on the trade weighted exchange rate 
adjusted for inflation differentials which are measured by wholesale prices of non-food manufactures. 
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more on market forces, e.g. Poland, Hungary and China, necessary 
price adjustments have been rather severe, i.e. 7% to 9% annually. 
As for the developing countries, the economic shocks of 
4 
1979-1980 occurred when many countries were already grappling 
with serious internal stabilization problems, and events in these 
years only served to aggravate the situation. In 1980 inflation 
showed serious acceleration in all regional groups, although 
the countries of South and East Asia continued to stand out for i; 
remarkably moderate rates of inflation as compared to other developing areas. 
(See table 8.) The very high level of inflation in developing 
countries is sufficient evidence of the domestic factors 
underlying inflationary pressures. However, the internal rate 
of price increase also has undoubtedly been impacted by external 
events such as higher import prices for key goods, e.g., energy 
and manufactured items, and devaluations brought on by weakening 
external balances. Another significant factor is "adjustment" 
inflation stemming from the fact that many developing countries 
are eliminating subsidies, freeing interest rates, etc, in order 




a, Developing Countries: Change m Consumer Prices — 
(percentage) 




Developing Countries —^ 8.9 19.4 21.3 18.3 24.4 23.2 41. 6 
Africa — 6.1 15.7 18.6 17.5 16.3 17.0 18. 8 
South & East Asia 6.6 12.6 8.7 6.4 11.7 9.4 13. 5 
West Asia ~ 6.5 21.1 24.2 24.3 31.5 32.2 84. 4 
e/ Latin America & the Caribbean — 12.4 26.0 32.6 27.0 35.8 33.5 55. 5 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues) and Cepal on the basis of official data. 
a./ Annual averages 
b/ Includes Yugoslavia and excludes Argentina, Chile and Ghana 
cj Excludes Ghana and South Africa 
d/ Includes Israel & Turkey 
e/ Excludes Argentina & Chile 
III. TRADE 
GATT has estimated that world merchandise trade reached nearly 2.000 
billion dollars in 1980, an increase of 20%,compared to a rise of 25% in 
1979. Almost all the rise was due to price increases, however, as 
volume was sl.uggish and rose by only 1 percfcat, one of the lowest rates 
of increase in the last 25 years. (In 1979 trade volume grew by 6%.) 
The less dynamic trade performance reflected a sharp absolute decline in 
the volume of petroleum exports and a fall in the growth rate of world 
trade in manufactures, from 5.5% in 1979 to roughly 3% in 1980. Growth 
of agricultural trade volume also may have decelerated to 4% from the 7% 
rate of expansion of 1980. If petroleum is excluded from consideration, 
world trade volume expanded by 4% in 1980.—^ 
In the developed market economies, the value of exports and imports 
rose by 17 and 19%, respectively, in 1980 (see table 9)) The growth of 
imports was due entirely to higher prices, as volume declined by 
nearly 2%, compared to an 8% rise in the previous year. Export growth 
also mostly reflected price trends, as volume rose by only slightly 
more than 3%. (It was 6.5% in 1979.) The terms of trade loss in 1980 
was roughly 8%. 
If one examines the OECD area it becomes evident that developing 
countries' imports are playing a significant role in helping to sustain 
overall growth rates. In 1980 the volume of OECD exports to OPEC countries 
rose by 20%>and with respect to the non-oil developing countries the 
2 / 
rise was 4%; both rates exceeded those recorded for intra-OECD trade.— 
GATT, focussing on trade in manufactured goods, has noted that in 1980 the 
oil exporters accounted for nearly 10% of the industrialized countries' 
exports, a new peak level. On a net basis, the trade surplus in manu-
factured goods with the oil exporters was 82 billion dollars in 1980, 33% greater than the 
JV See GATT, op. cit, p.l 
2/ See OECD, op. cit, p.55 
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TABLE 9 
VALUE OF WORLD TRADE BY ARÇAS -
(billions of dollars) ' 
EXPORTS (FOB) IMPORTS CIF) 
growth rates j rowth rates 
1979 1.980 b/ 1979 ' 1980 1979 -980 b/ - 979 1980 
|World ..638 1.985 21.0 1.68g 2.050 25 21 
» Developed Market Economies — 1.046 1.228 22 17.0 1.151 1375 28 19 i 
Oil Exporting Developing 
Countries 207 294 45 42.0 105 136 7 30 
Non Oil Developing 
Countries 199 247 27 24.0 249 320 25 29 
Centrally Planned Economies-/ 151 176 21 17.0 152 173 15 14 
Source: GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981 
a/ Please note that due to different sources of information the country classifications 
~~ used in this table are not entirely compatible with those employed in earlier tables 
of this world summary. 
—^ Preliminary 
c/ Includes South Africa 
£>/ FOB 
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previous year. While it is estimated that the value of trade in manufactures 
between the industrialized countries and the non-oil developing countries slowed 
down somewhat from the 25% rate of growth recorded in 1979, trade flows 
7ith thes.'i countries continued to be the f istest gro' ing ones ¿or 
industrialized coun ries.—^ 
Withii the centrally planned economi' s, trade i erformances 
varied considerably. The Eastern European countries, concerned about f 
their external indebtedness with international commercial banks, 
e 
pushed export volume up by roughly 3%, while completely containing 
the real growth of their imports. The Soviet Union, however, as a 
net exporter of petroleum enjoyed a favorable terms of trade and 
was able to expand import volume by about 5%, while exports rose 
in volume by a little more than one percent. Meanwhile, China 
was able to reduce a trade deficit largely on account of severe 
restrictions on imports. 
The oil exporting developing countries exports rose by 42% in 
value in 1980 entirely on the basis of rising world petroleum prices; 
the volume of exports declined quite sharply, estimated to, be somewhere £ 
near 13%. Needless to say the lower volume reflected the effects of 
sluggish world economic activity and general efforts at conservation 
of energy. Unlike 1979 when import volume tended to stagnate, in 
1980 these countries imports showed renewed and vigorous growth; they 
rose by 30% in value, compared to 7% in 1979,and volume was up by around ! /the 
15%. As already noted, the imports of/oil exporters in 1980 was an 
important factor in the trade performance of the industrialized countries, 
but they also did considerable importing from non-oil developing 
countries and were a significant factor in this latter group's efforts 
J/ See GATT, op. cit, p.11 
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to sustain their export drive. 
The non-oil developing countries expanded the value of their exports 
by almost one quarter in 1980, while their imports rose by nearly 30% 
( ee again table 9..') Export earnings were pushed up basically by higher 
prices as volume expanded by only 3%. Prices for primary commodities 
I' (excluding petroleum) of developing countries displayed considerably 
dynamism in 1980 (see table 10) and it is estimated that for the year 
as a whole the rise in prices was 17%, which compares favorably to a 12% 
U 
increase in the price of manufactured goods exported by developed countries. 
Of course, the actual impact of prices depends on the commodity composition 
of exports; for instance, sugar exporters enjoyed a dramatic increase in prices 
that exceeded 150% (due to production shortfalls in Cuba and the USSR), 
while coffee producers saw their export prices slacken in 1980. In any 
event, when petroleum is accounted for, the non oil exporting developing 
countries encountered a serious deterioration of their terms of trade. 
The overall effect was a 46% increase in this groups trade deficit in 1980 . 
> (See again table 9.) 
1/ See GATT, op. cit., p. 4 
TABLE 10 
I 
s PRICES OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
1 (1975=100) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 JAN-SEPT 
1979 1980 
Primary Commodities 57 104 100 106 117 119 154 145 223 
Developed Market Economies 82 103 100 102 106 115 134 131 155 
Developing Market Economies 44 104 100 108 124 121 165 153 260 
Food 87_ 111 100 105 120 121 136 133 157 
Developed Market Economies 89 108 100 . 99 100 113 131 128 149 
Developing Market Economies 83 119 100 118 165 . 138 148 143 176 
Agricultural Raw Materials 101 120 100 112 124 132 159 158 166 
Developed Market Economies 100 113 100 109 119 124 149 149 153 
Developing Market Economies 103 130 100 118 132 146 175 174 186 
Non Ferrous Metals 106 131 100 109 117 126 167 163 188 
Developed Market Economies 100 123 100 108 117 126 165 161 186 
Developing Market Economies 122 150 100 112 117 127 172 168 193 
Primary Commodities 
Excluding Petroleum 85 107 100 106 118 121 138 13_5 155 
Developed Market Economies 85 103 100 102 105 115 132 130 148 
Developing Market Economies 85 116 100 115 144 133 149 146 171 
Source : United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 1981. 
IV, CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES AND FINANCE 
It is clear from table 11 that the world economy suffered another 
major upheaval in current account balances and financial requirements in 
i » 
197':-1980. Once again, rising oil prices thrust til®' oil; exporter^ into 
a vtry large „current account surplus —which ,:in real te\rmswas nearly 
i ; ; : equivalent tc the 1974 beak surplus— while ~:he other ¡..ajor economic 
groups fell into serioui> deficit positions. 
In some ways the current situation represents an improvement 
over 1974; for instance, in 1980 the industrialized countries 
(e.g. Germany and Japan) were assuming a relatively large share of the 
deficits, which could be deemed appropriate because they have the 
greatest capacity to finance them. Also, on the positive side, the oil price shock 
apparently did not erode investors' confidence as much as was the case in 1974. 
On the negative side, however, can be found the concern that the oil 
producers may be much slower in shedding their surpluses than they 
were during 1974-1978, in part because of an awareness that uncontrolled 
imports and growth can have undesirable political and social consequences. 
Meanwhile, the non oil developing countries had to encounter a massive 
rise in the cost of energy at a time when many still had not fully 
recovered from the internal and external imbalances created by events 
in 1974. Then the situation of the oil -importing developing countries 
has been made more precarious by the fact that prolonged stagflation 
in the industrialized countries is putting increasing pressure on 
declining industries " in "the North" and is generating new demands for protectionism. 
On the side of finance there are specters of difficulties because 
commercial banks —the chief financiers of developing countries' deficits 
in 1974-1978-- are already very exposed in the heavily indebted Third World 
TABLE 11 
WORLD CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES — 
(Billions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Industrial Counts«« -20 2 -16 -23 15 -36 -74 
Oil Exporting Developing Countries 60 27 37 29 5 68 115 
Non-oil Exporting Developing Countries -26 -30 -18 -13 -23 -36 -50 
Centrally Planned Economies -10 -18 -13 -9 -10 - 3 -7 
Source: GATT. Press ¿¿lease, 10 March 1981; OECD Economic Outlook, No.28, December 1980, and Cepal on the 
basis of official data. 
a/ After official trs^-zfc^i 
.b/ Please note that due to different sources of information the country classifications used in this 
table are not entirely compatible with those employed in earlier tables of this world summary. 
oj Preliminary 
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and are showing signs of reluctance with regard to assuming major 
responsibility in this, the second round of the recycling process.—^ 
But perhaps the most distressing problem of ail is that after mere than 
s: x years <">f stagflation there appears to be few new i ¡eas on hew probler s 
should be i mfronted for the purpose of restoring growth and prosperity 
1/ 
to the world economy.--
Notwithstanding the worsening of the daficit situation of the 
developing countries' external accounts, preliminary evidence suggests 
that there was a decline in borrowing from private international capital 2/ 
markets for the first time in a number of years (see tabl® 12 and 13) 
This can be attributed to factors on both the supply and demand sides. 
With regard to supply, and as already mentioned, commercial bankers 
appear to have become reluctant to fully commit themselves to a new 
0 
round of massive lending to 
JV The commercial banks apparently feel that their capacity to máintain 
the vigorous rates of growth of lending that the world has become 
accustomed to will be constrained by prudential concerns and the 
limiting forces of capital/asset ratios. For an excellent discussion 
of this issue see Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets, 
September 1980. 
2/ The works cited earlier by Lewis, Muller and Thurow contain some of the 
few available innovative ideas for resolving the current world problems. 
Another new and innovative contribution to the debate over how to 
overcome the world economic crisis will be found in the forthcoming 
book by Raul Prebisch, Capitalismo Periférico: Crisis y Transformación, 
Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981. 
_3/ Aside from the fact that data for 1980 are still very preliminary in 
nature, the estimates for 1980 probably overstate the fall in borrowing 
because in this year there appears to have been more recourse to 
unpublicized borrowing and individual as opposed to large syndicated 
credits. 
TABLE 12 
PUBLICIZED EUROCURRENCY CREDITS 
(billions of U.S. dollars or equivalent) 
1980^ 
Rates of Growth 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1978 1979 1980 
TOTAL 28.5 20.6 28.7 34.2 73.7 70.2 66.2 115.5 -4.8 -5.7 
Industrialized Countries 17.3 5.1 8.3 11.1 31.3 19.0 28.8 182.0 -39.3 51.6 
Developing Countries —^ 9.7 12.5 17.3 20.2 38.3 43.2 34.5 89.6 12.8 -20.1 
(Oil Exporters) (0.2) (0.3) (1.6) (3.3) (2.7) (0.7) (0.4) (-18.2) (-74.1) (-42.9) 
Centrally Planned 
Economies 1.1 2.7 2.4 2.7 3.7 7.5 2.3 37.0 102.7 -69.3 
Other 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 100.0 25.0 20.0 
Source: World Bank 
a7 Preliminary estimate 
hj Please note that the World Bank includes the .Mediterranean region of Europe in this group. 
TABLE 11 
PUBLICIZED FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES 
(billions of U.S. dollars or equivalent) 
1980 
Growth Rates 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1978 1979 1980 
TOTAL 22.8 34.3 36.1 37.5 37.8 37.1 3.9 0.8 -1.9 
Industrialized Countries 16.1 23.2 22.8 22.6 24.6 25.7 -0.9 8.9 4.5 
Developing Countries —^ 1.0 2.3 4.8 6.1 4.0 2.9 27.1 -34.4 -27.5 
(Oil Exporters) ( - ) ( - ) (0.1) (0.1) ( - ) ( - ) ( " ) 
Centrally Planned 
Economies 
0.1 0.1 0.3 - - - - - -
Other 5.6 8.7 8.2 8.8 9.2 8.5 7.3 4.5 -7.6 
Source: World Bank 
a/ Preliminary estimate 
b/ Please note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean region of Europe in this group. 
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developing countries and as a result they apparently are being more 
cautious and selective in extending loans. With regard to the demand 
side, many developing countries preferred to avoid the market in 1980 
because lending conditions had become rather onerous. While spreads 
on eurocurrency credits —by far the most important source of funding— 
\ 
remained low relative to the crisis period of 1975-1976 (see table 14), 
the base interest rate (LIBOR), which is the most important determinant 
of interest cost, reached record levels during 1980, averaging 14.15%, 
compared to 11.99% in 1979 and 9.36% and 6.42% in 1978 and 1977, 
respectively. — Also there was a noticeable tightening of maturity 
structures in 1980 (see table 15). In view of market conditions, many 
countries opted for finance via greater deployment of international 
reserves, which had been accumulated in considerable amount's in 
earlier periods when the terms of credit were more attractive, and 
more use was made of official finance, e.g. new IMF commitments to 
non-oil developing countries for balance of payments assistance rose 
2/ from only 2.2 billion dollars in 1979 to 7.2 billion dollars in 1980.— 
JV Rate for 6-month Eurodollars calculated from data in -various issues 
of Morgan Guaranty's World Financial Markets. 
2/ See IMF Survey, February 9, 1981, pp. 38-39. 
TABLE 14 
WEIGHTED SPREADS ON VARIABLE INTEREST 
a/ EUROCURRENCY CREDITS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -
1975 1976 1977 1978 ' 1979 1980 - 1 
Up to 0.500 - - 1.3 10.6 16.5 
0.501 - 0.750 - - 0.2 14.9 42.1 40.6 
0.751 - 1.000 - - 18.8 30.5 26.9 22.6 
1.001 - 1.250 1.9 8.2 13.7 21.7 13.3 10.4 
1.251 - 1.500 35.8 26.4 15.4 16.9 4.0 7.0 
1.501 - 1.750 36.1 29.9 32.2 6.7 1.9 1.7 
1.751 - 2.000 23.0 27.6 14.0 5.3 0.8 0.6 
2.001 - 2.250 2.6 6.5 3.0 1.7 0.1 0.1 
2.251 - and over 0.2 1.2 2.6 0.3 0.1 0.2 
UNKNOWN 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank 
a/ Please note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean countries of Europe in this classification, 
W Preliminary estimates. 
TABLE 14 
ORIGINAL MATURITIES ON EUROCURRENCY CREDITS 
a / 
TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -
(percentage distribution) 
Original 
maturity (years) 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 -
1 
over 1 - 3 . 0 0 5.7 2.3 3.9 2.9 5.3 6.5 
3.01 - 5.00 • 62.9 53.5 19.5 4.9 4.2 3.5 
5.01 - 7.00 24.1 30.7 64.0 27.2 7.7 20.8 
7.01 - 10.00 3.3 4.7 8.6 56.0 59.9 62.7 
10.01 - 15.00 1.7 - - 6.4 17.4 4.4 
15.01 - 20.00 - - — - 0.3 0.2 
20.01 - 25.00 - - - - - -
25.01 and over - - - - - -
UNKNOWN 2.2 8.9 4.0 . 2.5 5.2 1.8 
T O T A L 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: World Bank 
a./ Please note that the World Bank includes the Mediterranean countries of Europe in this category, 
b/ Preliminary estimates. 
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The trend towards more official finance appears to be part of a 
healthy adjustment in the structure of world financial flows. During 
the 1970s, commercial banks —fueled as they were by deposits of surplus 
oil producers— greatly expanded their lending to LDCs and as a con-
sequence they were able to dwarf the activities of official lenders 
such as the IMF and World Bank. However, commercial bank lending has 
tended to be concentrated in the group of upper income developing countries 
such as those in Latin America, and it would be unreasonable to expect 
the growth of lending to these countries to exceed the growth rate of the 
banks' capital base for an indefinite period.—^ Thus new lending from 
official institutions'would seem to be an appropriate and timely way 
to restore some balance in the structure, as well as maturity, of 
international capital flows to developing countries; furthermore, it 
would relieve some of the pressure on the banks and also provide for a 
more deliberate and coordinated international adjustment process. For 
this to happen, however, official institutions must be more successful 
in directly tapping the OPEC surplus, more than 50% of which found 
2/ 
its way into commercial bank deposits in 1979-1980. In 1980, 
both the I.M.F. and World Bank made — — — — j 
1/ After 1975 U.S. banks began to slow down their lending to LDCs, but 
even so, it has grown at a rate of 17% per annum in face of a 13% 
per annum expansion of the capital base. Meanwhile, over the same 
period non-U.S. banks have been expanding loans to these countries 
at a rate of 40% per annum, while the average capital base has risen 
at only 25% per annum. See Morgan Guaranty Trust, op. cit., 
September 1980, p. 8. 
2/ See William J. Gasser, "The Global Payments Problems" Quarterly 
Review (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Winter 1980-81, Vol. 5, 
No. 4, p. 32. 
) 
proposals to augment their resources via borrowing agreements with 
OPEC countries: the IMF has recently reached an agreement to borrow 
8 billion SDRs from the Government of Saudi Arabia over the next 
2 years, with a tentative agreement for another A billion SDRs in the 
third year,—while the World Bank is exploring support for a new energy 
affiliate which would imply additional resources of up to 12 billion dollars. 
These new initiative are welcome and are clearly in the mutual interest 
of both the North and South. Hopefully these programs represent the 
initial steps to a more dynamic and expanded role for multilateral 
lenders during the decade of the 1980s. 
1/ IMF, Morning News, March 30, 1981 
2/ See World Bank, Energy in the Developing Countries, August 1980. 
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